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THE GAULT DECISION AND PROBATION SERVICES
WILLIAM H. SHERIDANt
In In re Gault,' the Supreme Court removed some of the myths
which have shrouded the operation of juvenile courts for several decades.
The hue and cry from a few quarters notwithstanding, this decision will
neither frustrate the purpose nor destroy the concept of the juvenile court.
It will, however, require changes in court practices and procedures and
may also necessitate legislative revision. It is also hoped that it will
promote the development of court rules, which are seriously lacking in the
juvenile courts. There is ample evidence that the decision has stimulated
dispassionate analysis of an institution which has had and will continue
to have a profound impact on the lives of millions of children and families.
Hopefully this analysis will generate the action which has long been
needed to improve our juvenile courts.
In Gault, six basic issues were presented: right to notice of charges,
right to counsel, right to confrontation and cross-examination, privilege
against self-incrimination, right to a transcript of the proceedings, and
right to appellate review. The Court narrowed the application of its
findings by cautioning that "we are not here concerned with the pro-
cedures of constitutional rights applicable to the pre-judicial stages of the
juvenile process, nor do we direct our attention to the post adjudicative or
dispositional process." 2 Mr. Justice Fortas then referred to a footnote
discussing the use of preliminary conferences and consent decrees to
dispose of cases short of adjudication.3 Such functions, as a rule, are
discharged at what is referred to as the intake stage in the juvenile court
process.4 In other words, the Court directed its attention to the six issues
as they relate to the adjudicative hearing, i.e., the hearing to determine
the validity of the allegations in the petition.'
tAssistant Director, Division of Juvenile Delinquency Service, Children's Bureau,
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. Id. at 13.
3. Id. at 31 n.48.
4. Sheridan, Juvenile Court Intake, 2 1. FAMILY L. 139-156 (1962); Waalkes,
Juvzenile Court Intake-A Unitue and Valuable Tool, 10 CRIME & DE..INQ-ENCY 117-123
(1964) ; Wallace & Brennan, Intake and the Family Court, 12 BUFF. L. REv. 422-451
(1963).
5. Part II of the decision dealing with the background and history of the juvenile
court and the cases cited may provide indications as to the direction of future decisions.
See Dorsen & Rezneck, Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 FAMIY L.Q. 1-46
(1967) ; Neigher, The Gault Decision: Due Process and the Juvenile Courts, 31
FED. PRo0ATioN 8-18 (1967).
See Generally CH:LDRFN'S BUREAU, PUB. No. 437, STANDARDS FOR JUVENMLE AND
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The Article discusses Gault with reference to its impact upon
probation practices. The extent and nature of its impact will be affected
by the nature of the role probation services play in the juvenile court
process, which varies from court to court in a given jurisdiction. There-
fore, what the writer considers to be the primary and appropriate
functions of probation officers at various stages of juvenile court pro-
ceedings will be set forth. These are: (a) assisting with intake, which is
pre-judicial in nature and essentially a screening process in the form of a
brief review to determine what action on the complaint, if any, is nesess-
ary for the protection of the child or the community; (b) after a petition
has been filed, making a predispositional study of the child and family and
the preparation of recommendations based upon the study for use by the
court at the dispositional hearing; (c) presenting the findings of the
study to the court in the dispositional hearing; and (d) providing case-
work, groupwork, or other therapeutic services or help for children who
have been placed on probation or placed under the supervision of the
probation officer by court order.
These functions limit the probation officer's role to pre-judicial and
dispositional aspects of juvenile court procedure, both of which the court
specifically exempted from its concern in this case. Consequently one
might expect the findings in Gault to have little impact upon probation
practices. However, action necessary to implement some of the court's
findings in the areas of notice, right to counsel, and self-incrimination
will need to be taken prior to the adjudication hearing and, therefore, may
have a significant impact upon the activities of the probation officer.6
FAMILY COURTS (1965) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS: CHILDREN'S BUREAU,
PROPOSED FAMILY COURT AcT [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED AcT]: UNIFORM JUVENILE
COURT AcT (Third Tentative Draft) [hereinafter cited as UNIFORm ACT].
6. A youngster's right to confrontation and cross-examination in the adjudicative
hearing should have no effect upon probation practices. It has been recommended that
these rights, with some modification, should also be available to the youngster in the
disposition hearing with reference to the persons who conduct studies and examinations;
this would include probation officers. See STANDARD JUVENILE COURT AcT § 19(comment) and STANDARD FAmY COURT AcT § 19 (comment) [hereinafter cited as
STANDARD AcTs] for the Children's Bureau recommended procedure. These acts were
prepared by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency in cooperation with the
Children's Bureau and the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges in 1959.
The comment provides that:
[iun the disposition part of the hearing any relevant and material infor-
mation, including that contained in a written report, study or examination,
shall be admissible, and may be relied upon to the extent of its probative
value; provided that the maker of such a written report, stuyd or examin-
ation shall be subject to both direct and cross-examination when he is reason-
ably available....
For provisions similar to the above, see Hawaii Family Court Act, No. 232, ch. 333,
1965 Hawaii Sess. Laws 360, amending, HAWAII REv. Laws, ch. 333 (1955); UNIEoiu
AcT. If the right to confrontation is later applied to these circumstances, probation
practices will affected.
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Notice and Right to Counsel
The issue of right to counsel in the adjudicative hearing should not
affect probation practice, since the probation officer should not be involved
in this aspect of the juvenile court process." Effective use of this right
may be directly related, however, to the time when notice of the right to'
counsel is given to the child. It has been advocated that notice be given
at the time of service of summons8 or at the time the child is placed in
detention, whichever occurs first,' or at the time of intake." Although
the timeliness of notice was not an issue in Gault, probation officers may
eventually have responsibility for providing notice as part of the intake
process.
It may well be, however, that attorneys will be increasingly involved
in the intake phase and at the disposition hearing as -well. This will have
considerable impact upon probation practices, particularly in those courts
where few if any attorneys have appeared in the past. The nature of the
impact may be partly discerned from the attitudes of some probation
officers who have complained that the presence of an attorney tends to
create an adversary proceeding" and, as a result, conflict coupled with
a feeling of mutual distrust develops between the probation officer and
counsel. It has also been alleged that the lack of counsel for the state
places the probation officer in the role of "prosecutor" in the eyes of the
youngster and his family. Thus Gault may enable probation officers to
assume their proper role. The increasing appearance of defense attorneys
should provide a powerful incentive to the state to see that its interests are
also protected by attorneys. If this is done, not only would probation
officers be able to devote more time to their proper functions, but the
harmful results of their presence in the adversary setting would be
significantly reduced.
While the Juvenile Court judge may, of course, receive ex parte analyses
and recommendations from his staff, he may not, for purposes of a decision
on waiver, receive and rely upon secret information, whether emanating
from its staff or otherwise. The Juvenile Court is governed in this respect
by the established principles which control courts and quasi-judicial agencies
of the Government.
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 565 (1966). Although Kent was decided on
statutory grounds and related to a waiver proceeding, the principle stated above might
well be considered applicable to the dispositional hearing in order to meet the essentials
of due process and fair treatment. However, the right to confrontation and cross-
examination in the disposition hearing was not considered by the Court in Gaudt.
7. An exception to this occurs when a youngster is before the court for a violation
of probation, in which case the probation officer may have requested the hearing.
8. See UNIFORm AcT § 17.
10. See STANDAmS 55.
11. In the opinion of the writer, this element has always been present. The
individual has a right to object to the state's interfering in his life and the state should
be required to prove the necessity of such intervention. Obviously, an adversary
situation arises, at least in the eyes of the child and his family.
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The lawyer's role, however, must not be confused with that of the
probation officer. Some advocate that the lawyer make social studies, make
referrals to various community agencies for treatment, and provide con-
tinuing counseling of a social nature after disposition-i.e., become the
probation officer. The extension of the role of the lawyer into the non-
legal phases of the juvenile court process is, however, neither practical nor
desirable. Although an attorney should have general knowledge of the
nature and adequacy of the treatment services available to his client, he
will find that he has neither the time nor the competence to assume
responsibility for providing them himself. However, in communities
where services are lacking in availability or quality, he, as a citizen and
interested professional, should actively seek improvement.
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination.
The issue of privilege against self-incrimination arose in relation to
admissions made by Gault to the judge in the adjudicative hearing. Any
additional questioning by the probation officer and any admissions which
may have been made to him did not, however, appear in the record. For
this reason, the Court specifically pointed out it was not considering the
status of out-of-court admissions made to the probation officer. Even if
such admissions had appeared in the record, their validity should not be
an issue in the adjudicative hearing since the probation officer and his
report should have no role in this hearing. As an additional safeguard, it
has been recommended12 that use of any information secured by the
probation officer during the pre-adjudicative process should be prohibited
in any hearing prior to disposition in the juvenile court or conviction in a
criminal court if the case is transferred.
Therefore, with the exception of the right to counsel, Gault clearly
will have little if any impact on probation services as functionally defined
in this paper. It is equally obvious from a reading of the facts in Gault
that probation practices in Arizona are at considerable variance with the
author's definition. This is true of numerous other courts with similar
practices.
12. The UNIFORMt AcT § 10, provides that:
No incriminating statement made by a patricipant while such counsel and
advice is being given, offered or sought, or 'in the discussions or conferences
incident thereto, shall be admitted in evidence over objections on any hearing
prior to the hearing on disposition or, in a criminal proceeding against him,
at any time prior to conviction.
The PROPOSED ACT §§ 14, 30, provides similar protections with respect to statements
made and information secured during the intake and pre-disposition study. Also, see
STANDARD: 59. "Futhermore, no statement made during a preliminary conference may
be used later in a juvenile hearing to determine the allegation in the petition or prior
to conviction if transferred to adult court." Similar provisions are also included in
some of the more recent state juvenile court statutes.
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The probation officer was deeply involved in the Gault case but as a
probation officer in title only. He was in fact a policeman and a prosecut-
ing official. He took the child into custody, initiated proceedings, filed and
verified the petition, appeared as the complaining witness to testify against
the child, and generally conducted himself as a prosecuting official. In
addition, he was obligated to protect the interests of neglected, delinquent
and dependent children in the county as well as to "be present in court
when cases are heard covering children and represent their interests."'13
Obviously, these duties are in conflict-a fact which was recognized by
the court. Such a situation must create confusion for all concerned and
particularly for the poor, uneducated, or uninformed persons who are
often centrally involved. As already noted, in Arizona these functions of
the probation officer are assigned by statute, and several other states have
similar provisions.'4
In most states, the statute authorizes any person to file a petition.'5
In addition the statutes of many of these states specifically authorize the
probation officer to perform this function. Since probation practices often
vary from community to community, even with a state, the actual number
of courts in which the officer files the petition is not known; however,
evidence gained by the children's bureau through consultations and
surveys indicates that this practice is extensive. In about forty percent of
the states, the probation officer, by statute, is vested with the full powers
of a peace officer, and in about the same percentage of states he is charged
with representing the interests of the child in court.
Statutory revision will, therefore, be necessary in some states in order
to modify probation practices. In other states, hopefully, such modification
could be accomplished through court rules.
Another practice which has led to confusion as to the role of the
probation officer is the failure of many courts to recognize the need for
a bifurcated hearing, i.e., separation of the adjudicative and dispositional
13. Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-204(C) (3) (1956).
14. California has the same provisions. In Iowa either the district attorney or the
probation officer is required to file the petition. In Virginia the probation officer is
required to file if directed by the judge.
15. The STANDARD AcTs, use the phrase "any person" without any express
limitation on the commencement of proceedings by the probation officer. Sec. 6
"Powers and Duties of Probation Officers," of the UsFoam, AcT, provides that 'a
probation officer does not have the powers of a law enforcement officer nor may he
commence or conduct proceedings under this Act against a child who is or may be
under his care of supervision." Sec. 6 of the PROPOSED AcT, provides that "a probation
officer does not have the powers of a law enforcement officer nor may he commence or
conduct proceedings under this Act against a child who is or may be under his care of
supervision." Sec. 6 of the PROPOSED AcT, provides that ".... a probation officer does
not have the powers of a law enforcement officer nor may he commence proceedings
under this Act with respect to a child who is not on probation; ...."
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phases.16 Although the Supreme Court distinguished between these two
phases in Gault, there is no evidence that the trial court recognized that
distinction. Even if it had, such a distinction would be meaningless
since the probation officer was discharging several inconsistent roles.
It has also been stated that the Gault decision requires that the
administration or probation services be divorced from the judiciary."
Regardless of the validity of this conclusion, such action would aid in
clarifying the role of the probation officer and has been recommended by
the author for several additional reasons." No doubt other cases raising
issues pertinent to the pre-adjudication and dispositional phases of
juvenile court procedures will reach the Supreme Court in the near fu-
ture. 9 Decisions on those issues will probably also have a direct bearing
on probation practices.
The need for clarification of the role of the probation officer is thus
increasingly apparent. Every effort must be made to assure that probation
procedures do not conflict with current due process safeguards or those
decreed applicable in the future. Hopefully the Gault decision, in addition
to establishing procedural safeguards in juvenile court proceedings, will
also lead to the clarification of the role of the probation officer in such
proceedings.
16. See STANDARD AcTs § 19 (Comment); UNIFORM ACT § 28; PRESIDENT'S
Comm'x ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TnE CHALLENGE
OF CRIME IN A FREE Soc=y 87 (1967) ; STANDARDS, 67.
17. Note, Juvenile Justice in California-A Re-Evaluation 19 HASTINGS L.J.
119 (1967-68).
18. Sheridan, New Directions For the Juvenile Court, 31 FED. PRoB. 15 (1967).
19. In re Whittington, appeal docketed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3163 (U.S. Oct. 17, 1967)
(No. 701).
